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ABSTRACT
This short essay considers the findings and recommendations of the Paulson Report
relating to securities fraud class actions under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. While the
report exposes numerous problems with securities litigation in the United States, it
understates the problems inherent in stock-drop actions. As a result, the report fails to
propose an effective fix. As the report recognizes, diversified investors gain nothing from
stock-drop actions: Because the corporation pays, holders effectively reimburse buyers
and sellers keep their gains. In other words, the system suffers from circularity akin to a
game of musical chairs in that stock-drop actions ultimately do no more than transfer
wealth among investors. Indeed, diversified investors are net losers to the extent of
attorney fees and other costs of litigation. But the report fails to note that issuers who are
targets of such actions see their stock drop in price by more than it otherwise would
because of the prospect of litigation and a feedback effect: When the issuer pays to settle
the case, the payment further reduces the value of the company, which leads to a further
decrease in stock price and a further increase in the potential for damages. In the end, a
target company faces a higher cost of capital than it would in a world without securities
fraud class actions. And in some cases it may face financial ruin. The report also fails to
note that diversified investors may suffer genuine financial loss when insiders take
advantage of nonpublic information for personal gain or when they damage the reputation
of the company by failure to be candid with the market. In such cases, stockholders have
a real gripe and should have a remedy. The simple solution is for the courts to deem
stock-drop actions under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 to be derivative actions rather than
direct (class) actions. It is well settled that it is up to the court to decide whether an action
is direct or derivative. The fact that the parties style the action as a direct (class) action
rather than as a derivative action does not make it so. By recasting stock-drop actions as
derivative actions, the courts could in one stroke eliminate the glaring market inefficiency
of circular recovery, lower the cost of capital for issuers, emphasize individual
responsibility, induce boards of directors and gatekeepers to become more vigilant, and
reduce the need for criminal prosecution.
KEYWORDS: Paulson Committee, securities litigation, enforcement, stock-drop action,
diversification, circularity, feedback, cost of capital, class action, derivative action, issuer
action, Rule 10b-5
JEL Codes: G10, G20, G30, K22, K41
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Legal scholars have known for years that securities fraud class actions – stock-drop
actions – make no economic sense. Finally, the financial world has taken notice. The
report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (popularly known as the Paulson
Committee) finds that “the public value of securities class action litigation is
questionable” because (1) the costs fall on the corporation and thus its stockholders (even
though the company gained nothing from the fraud), (2) settlements account for a very
small percentage of total investor losses, and (3) the settlement is effectively paid by
investors who held shares at the time of the fraud to investors who bought during the
fraud period.1 This litany of problems is really three ways of saying the same thing:
securities fraud class actions suffer from circularity.
Regrettably, the report misses the simplest and most powerful point it could have made:
In a stock-drop case – as in musical chairs – someone is going to suffer the loss one way
or the other. The so-called fraud is nothing more than a delay of the inevitable. The loss
suffered by those who buy during the fraud period – the period before the truth comes out
– is nothing more than bad luck in buying at the wrong time. Their bad luck is offset –
dollar for dollar – by the good luck of investors who happen to sell at the right time. In
other words, securities fraud is a zero sum game.
Moreover, the report understates the case against stock-drop actions. Because most
investors are diversified, they suffer no net harm from securities fraud. A diversified
investor who trades from time to time – for purposes of portfolio balancing, tax planning,
and so forth – is equally likely to gain as to lose.2 It all comes out in the wash. Diversified
1

See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (November 30, 2006) at 78-79
(hereafter Report). A stock-drop action is fundamentally different from an action based on a fraudulent
offering by an issuer company. In a fraudulent offering, the company obtains funds under false pretenses
and investors may recover under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act). In a stock-drop action, buyers
of outstanding stock seek to recover losses when the stock declines in price as a result of the disclosure of
bad news that allegedly should have been disclosed before the buyers bought. A stock-drop action is
typically based on the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) and
specifically Rule 10b-5 thereunder. These two types of actions may arise simultaneously if a publicly
traded company issues additional stock. In such a case, those who buy the newly issued stock sue under the
1933 Act. And those who buy outstanding stock sue under Rule 10b-5. It is much easier to make out a case
under the 1933 Act, but damages are limited to the difference between the offer price and the market price
after decline. Under the 1934 Act damages are the difference between purchase price and market price after
decline. Thus, an individual who buys newly issued stock in the aftermarket at a price higher than the issue
price would really have two claims, one under each act. For the year 2006, only about 12 percent of cases
involved fraudulent offerings. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Actions Filings, 2006: A Year in
Review, at 20. The focus here is on stock-drop actions under the 1934 Act.
2

Recent studies indicate that only about one-quarter of trading volume is motivated by stock-picking
whereas about three-quarters of trading volume is motivated by other strategies such as portfolio balancing,
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investors are effectively insured against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified.
Litigation is pointless.3 Investors in the aggregate are net losers to the extent of attorney
fees. The costs of litigation, including both direct expenses and such intangibles as
management distraction, are a dead weight loss that reduces investor returns.4 For a
diversified investor, it is the equivalent of paying for two insurance policies against the
same risk.5
In addition, as the report correctly notes, a diversified investor is likely to be a nontrading holder of many stocks that become the target of securities fraud class actions. In
such cases, non-trading holders effectively reimburse buyers because the issuer pays the
settlement. Thus, although diversified investors break even as traders, they always lose as

tax planning, arbitrage, and so forth. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, Is Stock Picking Declining
Around the World? AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (November 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627; Martijn Cremers & Jianping Mei, Turning Over Turnover, Yale ICF
Working Paper No. 03-26, AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings (November 2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=452720 (finding that about three-quarters of trading is motivated other than by
stock picking). See also Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New
Measure that Predicts Performance, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (January 15, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding that more active managers of nonindex funds outperform less
active managers); Meir Statman, et al., Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, AFA 2004 San
Diego Meetings (March 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=168472. For a treatment of trading frequency from
a legal point ov view, see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 Va. L. Rev. 713
(1995). See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Reply: Agreeing to Disagree over
Excessive Trading, 81 Va. L. Rev. 751 (1995). It is possible that the mix of investors varies from one
corporation to the next. That is, it is possible that a particular corporation may attract the disproportionate
attention of stock pickers. But for most companies, most trading appears to be motivated by other factors.
3

It is peculiar – and somewhat misleading – that the report notes that settlements account for only a small
fraction of investor losses and that it reasons that securities fraud litigation does a poor job of compensating
investors. The simple explanation is that only buyers have standing to sue. But if holders also had standing
to sue for their losses, the gain from the settlement would be exactly offset by a decrease in the value of the
subject stock. For example, in discussing the minimal contribution typically made by individuals, the report
states that the twelve outside directors of WorldCom paid about $25 million in damages even though the its
potential liabilities were over $70 billion, the market capitalization of WorldCom at its peak. The implicit
assumption is that in a fair world investors should be able to recover that amount. But WorldCom was
never in fact worth $70 billion. It was bound to decrease in value as the market became more rational and
less exuberant and as its creative accounting came to light. But WorldCom was still worth something. It
failed in the end not because it was a fraudulent enterprise but because of the prospect of securities fraud
litigation.
4

Plaintiff attorney fees are average about 20 percent of the recovery. Report at 72, 79. Defense attorneys
probably command about the same amount. See Thomas Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. Chicago L.
Rev. 487 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=909346
5

This would be quite apparent – and quite controversial – if the law required sellers to give up their gains
to reimburse buyers.
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holders.6 Accordingly, a diversified investor is not merely indifferent to securities fraud
litigation. A diversified investor should be positively opposed to the system as it stands.7
Feedback and the Cost of Capital
The report fails to recognize altogether that because the company pays, its value – and
thus its stock price – falls even more than it would have fallen because of the disclosure
of bad news. As a result, buyers claim even more in damages, the settlement grows even
larger, and the stock price falls even further. In other words, the prospect of securities
fraud litigation gives rise to positive feedback that has the effect of magnifying the
decrease in the price of the stock.8
6

The report notes that the chances are about 10 percent that any given company will become the target of
securities litigation in any five year period. Report at 74. This is a roundabout way of saying that there are
about 10,000 listed companies and about 200 securities fraud class actions filed each year. In other words,
two in every hundred companies are likely to get sued in any given year. But the report fails to connect the
dots. If a diversified investor holds 500 different stocks through a mutual fund, ten stocks are likely to be
the target of a securities fraud action each year. If the mutual fund has an annual turnover ratio of 40
percent – about the market average – then on the average it will be a buyer in two cases, a seller in two
cases, and a holder in six cases. The fund and its investors will break even on the 40 percent of the portfolio
that trades during the year, but it will lose on the 60 percent that is held.
7

As the report points out, any given diversified investor may be on both sides of the recovery. Report at 79.
If an investor holds shares in the defendant company and buys more during the fraud period, he may lose as
much on the shares he holds as he recovers on the shares he bought. For this insight, the report cites John
C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1534 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=893833 (page references herein to SSRN). As I argue
elsewhere, holder-buyers who stand to lose more than they gain from a class action would oppose
certification of the action if they could vote on the matter. Thus, there is an inherent conflict of interests
within the plaintiff class that should preclude class certification. It is no answer that holder-buyers may opt
out of the action. If the action proceeds as a class action, they must remain in the plaintiff class to obtain
their share of any recovery. In other words, there is a kind of market failure at work here. And it is thus up
to the courts to remedy the situation by declining to certify the action as a class action. See Richard A.
Booth, Taking Certification Seriously – Why There Is No Such Thing as an Adequate Representative in a
Securities Fraud Class Action (November 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026768. To be sure, not all
stockholders are diversified. Indeed, recent studies indicate that the average individual investor in the US
holds just four stocks even though one can eliminate virtually all company-specfic risk by holding about 20
stocks. The report expresses some concern about undiversified investors. Report at 80. But it is well settled
that federal securities law protects reasonable investors. A passive investor who fails to diversify assumes
more risk than necessary without the prospect of any additional return. That is irrational behavior for an
investor. Moreover, most investors are well diversified, because at least three-quarters of all stock is held
through various institutional vehicles. Even if one is reluctant to deny a remedy to undiversified investors,
presumably the interests of the great majority of investors should trump those of a small minority of
investors. This is not to say that an individual undiversified investor might not have a legitimate claim on
occasion. For example, an investor who seeks to gain control of a target company is likely to be
undiversified. Such investors may sometimes be victims of fraud. But such investors are likely to have
claims against an identifiable seller (whether a stockholder or the company itself) and must likely show
reasonable reliance on some falsehood propounded by a counterparty.
8

See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J.
1 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197. To be sure, in many cases the settlement is paid by insurance.
Report at 78 and note 1 (a 1995 study indicates that insurance pays about 68 percent of claims and that
defendant companies pay about 31 percent). Moreover, there is reason to think that issuers collude with
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Legal scholars noted long ago that the market seems to overreact to bad news and
generally blamed it on market inefficiency.9 But a perfectly efficient market will
overreact to bad news – as a result of feedback – if it appears likely that the company will
become the target of securities fraud litigation as a result.10 The extent of the feedback
effect depends on the number of shares represented in the plaintiff class:
total decrease in market value = expected decrease / (1 – % of shares damaged)11
For example, if the expected decrease in firm value based solely on the revelation of bad
news (without feedback) is 10 percent and the plaintiff class – those who bought during
the fraud period – represent 40 percent of the shares, the total decrease in the value of the
shares will be about 17 percent:
total decrease in market value = .10 / (1 – .40) = .10 / .60 = .166
If the plaintiff class represents 50 percent of the shares, the total decrease in value will be
20 percent – twice the decrease that would be seen if there were no threat of a securities
fraud class action. And if the plaintiff class represents 80 percent of the shares, the total
decrease in value will be 50 percent – five times what it would have been if there were no
threat of a securities fraud class action. In other words, the company will be worth half
plaintiff lawyers to settle for amounts that will be covered by insurance. See Coffee at 43-50. One might
argue that feedback is unlikely to be significant because most of the cash for the settlement does not come
from the defendant company. But the fact that the settlement is paid by insurance does not eliminate
feedback. First, depletion of insurance by the settlement means that the company is exposed to the
possibility of other claims that will not be covered by insurance. In other words, one may think of insurance
as an off balance sheet asset that supports stock price. Second, insurance is likely to become more
expensive for the settling company in the future (as well as for other companies). Thus, the company will
have higher insurance expenses in the future, returns will be lower in the future, and stock price will adjust
downward accordingly. So feedback sneaks back into the picture one way or the other. On the other hand,
feedback will arise only to the extent that the market thinks the company will pay. If it is true that issuers
and plaintiff lawyers generally agree to settle for an amount that will covered by insurance, presumably the
market will react accordingly. In other words, market price will not necessarily fall by an amount that
reflects the full amount of damages that might be awarded, if the market thinks that the case will be settled
for some lesser amount.
9

See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421
(1994); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic,
and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1994). See also Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does
the Stock Market Overreact? 40 J. Fin. 793 (1985); Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Further
Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557 (1987).
10

This is not the usual pie-in-the-sky argument that the market knows all. Rather the point is that even if the
market is perfectly efficient it will overreact to bad news that is likely to give rise to a securities fraud class
action in the sense that the market price of the subject stock will fall by more than it should in light of the
bad news. In the real world, the market may fall even further as a result of true (inefficient) overreaction.
11

For a derivation of this formula, see the appendix hereto. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities
Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 1 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197.
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what it would have been worth in such a case even though the bad news was that its value
had fallen by 10 percent.12
Although the report correctly states that holders lose because the company pays, this
bland statement hardly captures the situation. Holders see their stock fall in price by more
than it should. And perhaps more important, the defendant company sees its market
capitalization – its aggregate value – fall by more than it should. Going forward, the
company faces a higher cost of capital than it should – if it survives.13
The report notes that individual defendants rarely pay any part of the settlement in a
securities fraud class action except in cases in which the company is insolvent and has
tapped out its insurance.14 But the report stops short of suggesting that individuals should
pay more (though it does endorse individual liability where appropriate). This is not too
surprising in that the report finds that securities fraud litigation confers no benefits on
investors. Rather, the report suggests a series of clarifications in the law defining
securities fraud and proposes that corporations and their stockholders should be free to
choose alternative dispute resolution methods.15 Neither of these recommendations
12

One of the intractable technical problems with securities fraud class actions is that there is no reliable
way to determine the number of damaged shares short of soliciting claim forms from the plaintiff class
because many of the damaged shares may have been traded repeatedly during the class period. See Robert
A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in
Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 Bus. Law. 483 (2001). This has given rise to several different (and
statistically dubious) models that purport to estimate the number of damaged shares. For a description of
the latest model, see Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for Shareholder
Class Action Litigation, 62 Bus. Law. 955 (2007). Although there is no easy way to determine the number
of damaged shares, the market may effectively estimate the number quite efficiently. See generally JAMES
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
13

About 30 percent of defendant companies end up bankrupt. See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan,
Cornerstone Research, Post Reform-Act Securities Settlements, 2005 Review and Analysis, at 14. In many
cases, defendant companies may be on the verge of failure anyway. But most publicly traded companies
have a solid core business. For example, Jensen and Murphy estimate that Enron was worth about $30
billion when it failed but not the $70 billion that the market attached to it. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin
J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to
Fix Them, ECGI Working Paper No. 44/2004 at 46. So the question is why did the market price of Enron
fall to zero? Feedback seems a likely answer. The same seems likely to be the case with WorldCom. In that
case, the class period was more than three years long, suggesting that almost all of the stockholders would
be members of the plaintiff class. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 294 F. Fupp. 2d 392, 2003
US Dist. LEXIS 8245 (SDNY). To be sure, many of the plaintiffs in the WorldCom litigation acquired their
shares from WorldCom itself as the company grew by taking over other smaller companies in stock for
stock deals. Such plaintiffs had legitimate 1933 Act claims against the company. But the irony remains that
in the case of both Enron and WorldCom, the plaintiffs would have been much better off if no securities
fraud class action had been filed.
14

Report at 78-79.

15

Report at 80-84. Specifically, the report recommends that the SEC and the courts should clarify the
meaning of materiality, scienter, and reliance. In addition, the SEC should use its powers to prevent
duplicative recovery in cases where there is both private litigation and an SEC enforcement action. And
plaintiff lawyers should be prohibited from engaging in practices that amount to paying clients to serve as
plaintiffs. The report also addresses the overuse of criminal sanctions, the dangers of imposing excessive
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addresses the real problem. In essence, the recommendation is that we should be more
efficient about handling pointless litigation.16
Issuer Recovery
Despite the problems inherent in class actions, there may be a point to other forms of
securities litigation. The report misses the important possibility that insiders – the CEO
and other high ranking officers – may gain from securities fraud. Have we forgotten that
Ken Lay, Jeff Skillings, Andy Fastow and other Enron insiders sold more than $800
million in Enron stock as the end drew near? In effect, they misappropriated $800 million
from the market.17 This is not to suggest that insider trading as narrowly defined under
federal law is the only way that insiders may do genuine financial harm to outsiders. For
example, it is not clear that backdating options constitutes insider trading, but it is quite
clear that it reduces returns to other stockholders. Moreover, even in the absence of
insider gain, failure to be candid with the market may do harm to the reputation of the
company among investors and cause a drop in stock price. But who should recover for
such wrongs? In a case of insider trading, it seems clear that the insider should give back
the gain. But to whom? How do we figure out who was on the other side of a trade? And
liability on auditors and outside directors. Report at 84-91. The executive summary emphasizes the need for
continued enforcement against individual wrongdoers. Report at xii. But curiously there is almost nothing
to that end in the discussion of securities fraud class actions. Rather, the report ultimately and rather
cryptically recommends that corporations and their stockholders should be free to choose alternative
dispute resolution methods. Report at 109-112. This might be read as something of an endorsement for
derivative actions.
16

One might naturally ask how we ended up with the confused system that we now have. The short answer
is that under the 1933 Act investors who buy newly issued stock have an express cause of action against the
issuer if there is any material falsehood in the registration statement or the prospectus. But the 1933 Act
also provides that the issuer cannot be held liable for any more than the proceeds of the offering. As a
result, the courts have ruled that only those investors who buy stock that is part of the offering may recover.
If the issuer is already publicly traded – if the offering is one of additional stock – it is likely that other
investors will read the offering materials and may rely on falsehoods therein in connection with the
purchase of already outstanding stock. The investor would not likely know whether the shares he bought
were part of the offering, but the courts nonetheless required plaintiffs to trace their shares back to the
offering in order to have standing to sue. In other words, for investors who bought their shares in the
aftermarket, it was largely a matter of accident whether one had standing to sue under the 1933 Act. It is
thus understandable that the courts would permit other investors to sue under Rule 10b-5 which carries
stiffer requirements of pleading and proof anyway. Indeed it became routine for plaintiff lawyers to add a
claim under Rule 10b-5 to all 1933 Act claims. See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. Tech. L. 185 (2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975949. It is not surprising that securities fraud class
actions became established in the 1960s at a time when most investors were poorly diversified and heavily
focused on company-specific factors. Bhattacharya and Galpin find that in the United States in the 1960s
about 60 percent of trading was motivated by stock picking. As noted above, they find that today only
about 24 percent of trading is motivated by stock picking. They predict that the level of stock picking will
continue to decline and will stabilize at about 11 percent. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, Is
Stock Picking Declining Around the World? AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (November 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627.
17

See Robert Prentice, Review Essay: Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 417 (2003).
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why should the counterparty recover because just because she happened to buy their
stock from one of the culprits rather than someone else?
There is a simple solution: issuer recovery. The corporation should recover the ill-gotten
gains of insiders.18 And if the corporation fails to seek recovery, a stockholder may file a
derivative action on behalf of the corporation. If the corporation recovers, the value of the
corporation increases dollar for dollar, and the recovery is effectively spread over all the
stockholders. There is no problem of circularity. And there is no feedback effect because
the company recovers. Investors are compensated to the extent of their true loss – the
amount that insiders have extracted from the market – and not the amount of losses that
would have occurred anyway. Moreover, the remedy is consistent with the fiduciary duty
that insiders owe to the corporation.
Issuer recovery is also consistent with the findings and recommendations in the report.
Indeed it is somewhat surprising that the report fails to connect the dots and propose a
similar solution. For example, the report suggests that enforcement should focus more on
individual wrongdoers while at the same time expressing general concern about the
overuse of criminal sanctions.19 In addition, the report suggests that recent revelations of
lawyers bribing plaintiffs indicates that in many cases plaintiffs are not otherwise inclined
to sue because they have not suffered any real loss (or would lose as much as holders as
they gain as members of the plaintiff class).20 Finally, the report also recommends that
the SEC clarify the meaning of scienter.21 Although Congress stiffened pleading
standards in 1995 by requiring facts indicating a strong inference of scienter, we seem to
have lost track of the fact that scienter means intent to defraud – intent to
(mis)appropriate the wealth of another by deception.22 However reprehensible it is for a
18

This seems quite obvious in a case of reputational harm. It would hardly make sense to make the
corporation pay because it was harmed by one of its agents. Yet that is essentially the system we have with
stock-drop actions. It also seems clear that in a case of options backdating, the optionee should give back
the ill-gotten options. That remedy addresses the harm to other stockholders – dilution – quite directly.
Insider trading has always been a bit confusing on this score because it has not always been clear why
insider trading is illegal. But the misappropriation theory seems now to be well settled. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Thus, it seems clear that the issuer can recover for the insider trading of its
fiduciaries. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F. 2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that if insider trading
is based on a theory of misappropriation of information from the source of the information, the source of
the information may have standing to sue but the counterparty to the trade does not). It is telling that the
1934 Act takes a similar position in §16(b) which provides that the issuer may recover insider gain from
short swing trading and that where the issuer fails to do so a stockholder may maintain a derivative action
to that end. This would seem to be a powerful argument for issuer recovery and against securities fraud
class actions under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
19

Report at xii.

20

Report at 82-84. See Richard A. Booth, Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue? washingtonpost.com, June 26,
2006.
21

Report at 80-82.

22

Exchange Act §21D. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d
179 (2007). See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (dissent of Justice White questioning
whether there could be fraud where perpetrator does not trade or otherwise gain); In re Time Warner
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company to lie to the market in the hope that bad news might be covered up, it is not
fraud, and there is no scienter, unless someone gains in the bargain.23
Issuer recovery would be easy to implement. The courts should simply deem securities
fraud class actions to be derivative actions – actions in the name of the corporation by
which the corporation recovers.24 The character of an action is a matter for the discretion
of the courts.25 The fact that the parties style the action as a direct (class) action rather
than as a derivative action does not make it so.26 The real harm from securities fraud (if
Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) (dissent of Judge
Winter arguing that corporate officers could not have expected alleged fraud to result in gain to the
corporation and that accordingly there could be no scienter). See generally Richard A. Booth, The Missing
Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. Tech. L. 185 (2007). available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975949
23

Curiously, Professor Coffee seems to assume that securities fraud class actions always involve insider
gain. See Coffee at 19-20. Not true. In 2006 only 42 of 110 cases (38%) involved allegations of insider
trading, while 20 of 110 cases involved options backdating. See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class
Actions Filings, 2006: A Year in Review, at 3, 20. The report also notes that few recent actions have named
auditors as defendants – even though about 60 percent of cases appear to be based at least in part on
allegations of improper accounting – probably because of the Supreme Court decision in Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), foreclosing claims for aiding and abetting. Report at 87. See
also Coffee at 16; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2004 Securities Litigation Study, at 11. Although the
point is that the accounting profession remains exposed to litigation, the (unintended) suggestion is that
many actions are based on illusory losses. Similarly, the report also suggests that the SEC should provide
more guidance about what constitutes materiality and reliance. In both cases, the thrust seems to be to
assure that the actions that are litigated are the ones in which there has been genuine economic loss.
24

As a practical matter, a court could so rule in a motion to certify on the rationale that conflicts within the
plaintiff class render an action for individual damages inappropriate for class action treatment under FRCP
23(b)(3). Specifically, the interests of buyers (who want the action to go forward) and buyer-holders (who
do not) conflict in a way that cannot be resolved by the formation of subclasses. But both groups would
favor a derivative action if there is insider misappropriation. And FRCP 23(b)(2) permits the court to
certify an action as a class action if:
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.
That is essentially a description of a derivative action or at least the part that involves compelling the
corporation to sue the wrongdoers. See Richard A. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously – Why There Is
No Such Thing as an Adequate Representative in a Securities Fraud Class Action (November 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026768. Interestingly, FRCP 23(b)(2) seems to permit such an action even in the
absence of demand on the corporation.
25

See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974); Tooley v.
Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031(Del. 2004).
26

Legal scholars seem to agree that it is up to the courts to fix the problem. AALS Section on Business
Associations, Annual Meeting, New York, January 3, 2008. Although the courts might be reluctant to
effect such a change, the SEC could presumably nudge them in right direction by using its broad power to
grant exemptions under federal securities law. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961
(1994). For example, the SEC might exempt issuers from class actions except in cases in which they have
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any) comes from the misappropriation of stockholder wealth by insiders. The
redistribution of inevitable losses among innocent investors is regrettable, but
stockholders can easily protect themselves from that sort of harm through diversification.
To be sure, in the absence of insider gain, the action will likely be dismissed.27 But that is
as it should be. No harm, no foul.28
What About Deterrence?
Professor Coffee argues that although securities fraud class actions are unlikely to afford
significant compensation to investors, they are the most important source of deterrence
we have. He recognizes that the threat of a stock-drop action constitutes wildly excessive
deterrence aimed at the wrong target. Nevertheless, he argues that eliminating corporate
liability would so reduce the incentives to sue that we would lose the deterrent effect of
private litigation: “One cannot safely eliminate corporate liability ... without radically
reducing the likelihood of private enforcement.” 29

dealt in their own stock or cases litigated as derivative actions. One might object that it is somehow
inappropriate to focus here on the procedural form of the action. In other words, whether one has a cause of
action should not depend on the procedural device one chooses to pursue it. The easy answer is that
Congress did exactly that in PSLRA and SLUSA by establishing special rules for securities fraud actions
that take the form of class actions. Looking back, that seems like an extraordinary thing to do. On the other
hand, it indicates that lawmakers somehow intuited the problem of circularity. Moreover, it is quite clear
that the courts have considerable discretion in the management of class actions because they affect the
rights of absent parties. That is the point of the certification requirement. A derivative action is ultimately a
type of class action. It would seem to follow (as the Delaware courts have known for a long time) that the
courts have the power to decide what form an action should take. See Richard A. Booth, Taking
Certification Seriously – Why There Is No Such Thing as an Adequate Representative in a Securities Fraud
Class Action (November 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026768. Here too, the SEC could play an
important role by intervening in securities fraud class actions at the certification stage.
27

Technically speaking, the issuer suffers no direct harm from many instances of misappropriation (such as
insider trading). Rather the claim is more one of unjust enrichment on the part of insiders. Still it is well
established that a corporation may recover in such circumstances. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE §5.04.
28

In addition, a derivative action is subject to procedural complications (such as the demand requirement
and the possibility that the corporation may seek voluntary dismissal) that may make it less desirable than a
direct action. Moreover, the settlement of a derivative action based on misappropriation or other gain to the
wrongdoer likely will not be covered by insurance. Thus, although defendant companies could argue on
their own initiative that securities fraud class actions should be recast as derivative actions, they are
unlikely to do so, because such claims would not be covered by insurance. As I discuss further below, the
SEC could help alleviate these problems by intervening in appropriate situations.
29

See Coffee at 41. The courts seem to agree. As Justice Ginsburg recently stated, “This Court has long
recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential
supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007).
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This is a peculiar argument. If there is so little at stake that the plaintiff bar will find it
uneconomic to sue, so be it.30 Moreover, if diversified investors are effectively insured –
by virtue of being diversified – against the possibility that they may buy at the wrong
time, what exactly do we want to deter? The only real worry for a diversified investor is
that insiders may take advantage of nonpublic information in some way to misappropriate
stockholder wealth from the market. But there is little danger of underdeterrence here.
There is plenty of motivation for plaintiff lawyers to file derivative actions. Who would
not be motivated by the prospect of a fee equal to (say) one-third of the $800 million
misappropriated by the officers of Enron? 31 Besides, one of the major problems with
securities fraud class actions is that the potential damages are wildly in excess of what is
needed for effective deterrence. With issuer recovery, the amount of any recovery is
likely to be quite small in compared to amounts claimed in securities fraud class actions,
but it is likely to be significant for an individual defendant.
Legal scholars have suggested a variety of other fixes for the class action mess. Some
have suggested a system of civil fines that limit the amount payable by the corporation.32
The problem with civil fines – as with criminal prosecution – is that they are not
particularly scalable. Fines – and criminal prosecution – are pretty much one size fits all.
And they fit no one particularly well.
The report suggests that SEC fines be used to compensate investor victims and that
private awards be reduced by such amounts.33 But that fix does not address the feedback
problem. The market does not care where the money goes or the route it takes when the
company pays. As long as the issuer remains on the hook for investor losses, feedback
will magnify the loss.

30

Maybe that is why plaintiff lawyers found it necessary to bribe plaintiffs to serve. See Richard A. Booth,
Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue? washingtonpost.com, June 26, 2006.
31

In addition, it is possible that misappropriation or other acts of bad faith by insiders may do harm to the
reputation of the business. If so, it may be appropriate for the corporation to recover damages over and
above the sums that insiders misappropriate. But because a securities fraud class action also causes a
decrease in the market price of the subject company, it is impossible to know how much real damage has
been done. In the absence of the threat of a class action, this element of damage would become much easier
to measure and where appropriate the corporation could recover. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del.
1998).
32

Coffee at 37. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz.
L. Rev. 639 (1996); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L.
Rev. 1487 (1996).
33

Report at 82. As the report notes, the SEC has authority under the Fair Funds for Investors provision of
the Sarbanes Oxley Act to use funds obtained from civil penalties to compensate victims of securities fraud.
Id. For the year 2004, class action settlements totaled $5.5 billion while SEC monetary sanctions totaled
$3.1 billion. Report at 71.
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Accordingly, others have suggested that issuers be exempt from liability under Rule 10b5 in cases in which the issuer itself does not sell stock.34 To be sure, that fix would leave
plaintiffs with nothing but an action against individual wrongdoers. But it does nothing to
change the way damages are calculated against the remaining defendants.35 Moreover,
there may be cases in which the issuer gains from securities fraud and should disgorge.
For example, if the issuer repurchases shares while sitting on good news, selling
stockholders may have a legitimate claim.36 So to exempt issuers is overbroad.
It is much simpler to clean up the class action mess with issuer recovery than with the
other fixes that have been proposed. By definition, issuer recovery exempts the issuer
because the issuer is the plaintiff. Thus, there is no need for an issuer exemption.37 Issuer
recovery also limits damages to the amount of insider gain. It is a much more efficient
way to limit damages because the limit is automatically scaled to the offense.38
The obvious argument against issuer recovery is that no corporation will go after its own
and that the corporation will likely do all it can to thwart any derivative action. That is
undoubtedly true in a world with securities fraud class actions. It is only natural that a
company accused of fraud will circle the wagons.39 No company would dare initiate an
34

Coffee at 63-67. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 976-99 (1994). For a response, see
Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 438, 439 (1994). For Professor Grundfest's response to Professor Seligman, see Joseph A. Grundfest,
Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 727 (1995).
35

On the other hand, it should be apparent that it makes no sense to hold other defendants liable for the all
the losses suffered by buyers. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).

36

See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berkeley Bus. L.
J. 1 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197.
37

If the issuer gains from the sale of overpriced stock, investors remain free to sue under the 1933 Act. If
the issuer gains from a repurchase of underpriced stock, sellers (who no longer own their stock) could
maintain a direct (class) action against the issuer as the actual buyer. There is no danger of feedback
because damages would be limited to the actual gain enjoyed by the corporation. See Richard A. Booth,
The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 1 (2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197.
38

Civil fines and criminal prosecution are blunt instruments. The penalty is more or less all or nothing. In
contrast, in a civil action, the plaintiff must plead and prove damages. Thus, with civil liability you know
who lost what and who recovers. In addition, a private plaintiff must weigh the costs and benefits of filing a
civil action. In other words, civil remedies are both self-executing and self-regulating. (As Gordon Gekko
might have said, the need to quantify the stakes clears the mind and focuses the will.) In contrast, neither a
regulator nor a prosecutor must prove damages. And neither has much of any reason not to prosecute an
offense other than the prospect of losing. On the other hand, simple compensatory damages may be
insufficient deterrence. If the only consequence of securities fraud is that one must disgorge ill-gotten
gains, there is little reason to give it a go. A similar problem with insider trading is addressed under the
Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act by providing for a treble the gain fine in addition to
compensatory damages. See Exchange Act §20A.
39

Coffee at 44.
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action against its own officers for fear that it would trigger a ruinous class action.40
Indeed, as the law currently works, it may even be rational to cover up bad news that is
likely to give rise to a class action. If the news is bad enough that a class action would
likely bankrupt the company, there may be nothing to lose from a cover up. Thus, it is
arguable that securities fraud class actions constitute a significant obstacle to effective
corporate governance. And that may explain at least in part the recent growth in the
criminal prosecution of such controversies.41
There is no reason to assume that a corporation will respond in the same way in the
absence of the class action threat. In the current environment, one can hardly fault an
outside director who concludes that it is contrary to the best interests of the corporation to
pursue an action against a CEO. In the absence of the class action threat, however,
outside directors would themselves be subject to potential legal action for failure to seek
restitution when appropriate, whereas outside directors are practically immune to legal
action as things stand.42
Nevertheless, the question remains: What is to keep the company honest if it is not liable
for misleading the market? In the absence of insider gain, there would seem to be no
reason for a company not to lie to the market. There at least two good answers.
First, companies act only through individuals who may be liable for any gain they enjoy
or facilitate for others and for any loss they cause by harming the reputation of the
company. To be sure, non-trading insiders may often be protected by the business
judgment rule because issuer recovery is essentially a matter of state law.43 But the
business judgment rule may not protect a non-trading insider from liability if there is a
violation of SEC rules.44 Moreover, the SEC always has the authority to prosecute a civil
enforcement action in any such case and may presumably join a private action where
appropriate.
Second, given that equity is the primary form of compensation for most CEOs and other
high level officers, insiders should have every incentive to assure that the market is as

40

Compare Coffee at 61-62.

41

See Richard A. Booth, What is a Business Crime? 3 J. Bus. Tech. L. xxx (2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029667.
42

Report at 90-91. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).

43

But see Exchange Act §16(b).

44

It is not clear that the business judgment rule affords protection against a clear violation of an SEC rule.
Just as speeding constitutes negligence per se if one is involved in an accident even if speeding might
otherwise be reasonable, the violation of an express SEC rule relating may constitute unprotected illegal
behavior for state law purposes. See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. Tech. L. 185 (2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975949.
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fully informed as it can be. Where equity compensation is the norm, no company can
afford to be blacked out of the market. Companies need to issue stock and options and to
buy back stock to control for dilution. And officers who exercise options need to sell
stock for tax planning and diversification. In other words, insiders themselves have every
reason to keep their companies honest.
Obviously, equity compensation did not prevent the most recent spate of frauds. Indeed,
some have argued that equity compensation was ultimately to blame.45 But the incentives
would be quite different if issuer recovery were the rule. As things currently stand, the
issuer foots the bill and insiders often keep their gains. If insiders are potentially liable to
disgorge any gain – fault or no fault – as misappropriation under state law, they should be
eager to ensure that the market is fully informed when they cash out. To be sure, one
might argue that issuer recovery would cause officers to insist on even more
compensation or costly insurance against such claims.46 But insurance is not generally
available if there is personal gain involved.47 The same goes for indemnification.48
To be sure, issuer recovery puts the board of directors in a somewhat peculiar position. In
effect, the board becomes an arbiter for the competing claims of officers and
stockholders. In some cases, the board must pursue claims against officers, while in other
cases, the board may conclude that it is not in the best interest of the corporation to do so.
But that is a good thing. Again, for a diversified investor, the only real worry is insider
misappropriation. Everything else comes out in the wash. But it is not always clear what
constitutes misappropriation. For example, although it seems quite clear that backdating
options is usually inappropriate, it is not so clear that granting options at a time when the
stock is trading at a low is problematic. Such decisions are judgment calls. The board of
directors is well suited to striking the required balance between stockholder expectations
and the competing interests of management. Moreover, to view the board of directors as
an arbiter is consistent with the proposal in the report that the SEC should explore the
possibility of permitting companies to opt out of class actions and into alternative dispute
resolution.49 That seems like an odd idea if one thinks of stockholders and the corporation
45

See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here,
What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, ECGI Working Paper No. 44/2004.
46

See Coffee at 65-67.

47

See generally Coffee at 57-62.

48

See DGCL 145. See also MBCA 8.51. A corporation may, however, advance litigation expenses in most
circumstances, subject to an agreement on the part of the recipient to repay if she does not prevail.
49

Report at 109-112. As I have argued elsewhere, it may make more sense to view a corporation as a
partnership between stockholders and officers in which the officers effectively work for a piece of the
action. See Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager,
2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=719983. This view is
consistent with recent scholarship about team production and may explain away much of the recent
controversy about executive compensation. Coincidentally, Jensen and Murphy have argued that the board
of directors should be viewed primarily as a management monitor and that the support role of the board be
viewed as strictly subordinate to its role as management monitor. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
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as adversaries. If that is the model, why should one party to a potential dispute (the
corporation) be permitted to dictate terms to the other (the stockholders)? But if one
thinks of the typical dispute as one between stockholders and officers about how to share
the corporate wealth, it is easy to see how the board of directors might officiate.
Finally, issuer recovery should reduce the need for criminal sanctions by freeing outside
directors to do the right thing. The criminalization of controversies that traditionally have
been seen as matters of corporate governance and fiduciary duty is due at least in part to
the failure of boards of directors to monitor management with any real enthusiasm.50 But
the danger of triggering a securities fraud class action – with the potential for costs far in
excess of any benefit to the stockholders – impedes vigorous action by the board of
directors. If we eliminate this obstacle to effective monitoring by the board of directors, it
may not be necessary to prosecute cases that do not involve a truly criminal enterprise.51
In the end, the Paulson Report took an important step in reforming securities fraud
litigation by exposing the contradictions and inefficiencies inherent in stock-drop actions.
The next step is for the courts (with a little help from the SEC maybe). By recasting
stock-drop actions as derivative actions, the courts could in one stroke eliminate the
glaring market inefficiency of circular recovery, lower the cost of capital for issuers,
emphasize individual responsibility, induce boards of directors and gatekeepers to
become more vigilant, and reduce the need for criminal prosecution. What a deal.

Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix
Them, ECGI Working Paper No. 44/2004 at 53-56.
50

See Richard A. Booth, What is a Business Crime? 3 J. Bus. Tech. L. xxx (2008);
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029667; Larry E. Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, U. Illinois Law
& Economics Research Paper No. LE06-021 (July 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=920140.
51

See Report at 84-86. Moreover, confusion about how to measure the loss from securities fraud also
infects criminal prosecutions in that sentencing guidelines require the courts to estimate the loss from the
fraud. Not surprisingly, prosecutors and the courts have used the same (questionable) theories used to
estimate stockholder losses in securities fraud class actions with the result that sentences have been wholly
out of proportion with the harm suffered by investors. See, e.g., United States v. Olis, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS
68281 (S.D. Tex.).
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APPENDIX
Securities fraud class actions usually arise from the failure of a publicly traded
company to disclose material information in a timely fashion. The information
may be either good news or bad news. In other words, a securities fraud action
may be triggered by news that causes the price of a stock to rise (in which case
those who sold during the fraud period suffer harm) or by news that causes the
price of a stock to fall (in which case those who bought during the fraud period
suffer harm). There are notable examples of both types of fraud. See, e.g., Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (good news); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (bad news). But bad news fraud is far more
common at least in part because of the way damages are awarded in securities
fraud class actions. Indeed, for the year 2006, there were only two cases out of
118 that involved good news. See Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, Securities Class Action Filings (2006).52 In a bad news case, the
fact that the company pays causes the price of the company’s stock to fall more
than it otherwise would. In contrast, in a good news case, the fact that the
company pays has the effect of muting the price increase that otherwise would
have obtained. Thus, the formula for calculating the feedback effect differs in the
two types of cases.
The pages that follow explain the derivation of formulas for the calculation of total
damages in both bad news cases and good news cases, together with a chart
showing the results for various class sizes as a percent of shares outstanding
(damaged shares or absolute turnover). The last page compares these results
graphically.

52

http://securities.stanford.edu/fmi/xsl/SCACPUDB/recordlist.xsl?-db=SCACPUDB&lay=Search&FIC_DateFiled_Year=2006&-sortfield.1=FIC_DateFiled&-sortfield.2=LitigationName&sortorder.1=ascend&-max=25&-find=&-lay.response=ListGral&-encoding=UTF-8&-grammar=fmresultset
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DERIVATION OF FORMULAS
BAD NEWS CASE
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)

$100M = 10/share

POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE

90M = 9/share

DAMAGES TO BUYERS (60% turnover)

6M = .60/share

NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)

90M − 6M = 84M = 8.40/share

But if market value post is 84M, then damages should be 16M x .60 = 9.6M.
Now market value post is 90M less 9.6M = 81.4M = 8.14/share.
Process repeats to limit of $15M in total damages to buyers.
DAMAGES TO BUYERS

15M / 600K shares = $2.50/share

NET TO HOLDERS

90M − 15M = 75M = $7.50/share

NET TO BUYERS

$7.50/share plus $2.50/share

GENERAL RULE FOR BAD NEWS CASES:
total decrease in market value = theoretical decrease / (1 - % of shares damaged)

BAD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES
Assume hypothetical pre-damages decrease of $10M:
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.5M or $1.25/share.
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $6.67M or $1.67/share.
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $10M or $2.00/share.
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $15M or $2.50/share.
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $40M or $5.00/share.
If 90% of shares are damaged, total award is $100M or $10.00/share.*

* Note that $100M is more than entire value of company at $9 per share.
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GOOD NEWS CASE
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)

$100M = 10/share

POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE

110M = 11/share

DAMAGES TO SELLERS (60% turnover)

6M = .60/share

NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)

110M – 6M = 104M = 10.40/share

But if market value post is 104M, then damages should be 4M x .60 = 2.40M.
Now market value post is 110M less 2.4M = 107.6M = 10.76/share.
Process repeats to limit of 3.75M in total damages to sellers.
DAMAGES TO SELLERS

3.75M / 600K shares = .625/share

NET TO HOLDERS

110M − 3.75M = 106.25M = 10.625/share

GROSS TO SELLERS

10/share + .625/share = 10.625/share

GENERAL RULE FOR GOOD NEWS CASES:
total increase in market value = theoretical increase / (1 + % of shares damaged)

GOOD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES
Assume hypothetical pre-damages increase of $10M:
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $1.67M or $.833/share.
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.86M or $.714/share.
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.33M or $.667/share.
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.75M or $.625/share.
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $4.44M or $.556/share.
If 100% of shares are damaged, total award is $5.00M or $.500/share.*

* Note that $5M is exactly half of the hypothetical increase.
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EFFECT OF TURNOVER ON MARKET PRICE
AFTER CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE
(pre-disclosure price = $10)
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